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1 Introduction
Educational institutions are scrutinized by policy makers. The bottom line of the critiques
is that schools are too disconnected from the labor market. Students are considered not
to acquire the skills needed by the productive sector; this would explain the failure of
the social system to provide young people with jobs and wage earnings. This argument
borrows from the widespread perception that skills learnt at school are not directly useful
once in the workplace. Providers of education are urged to make their teaching more
vocational so as to provide the skills that Governments, rms, and even students expect
from employable young workers.
General education does not teach anything valuable in the labor market per se. How-
ever, in the learning process, students acquire core skills that are useful everywhere in
the economy. In a nutshell, you dont learn math because math.com will hire you. You
learn math because math skills are very generic and people with generic skills can occupy
more jobs. The argument is in line with Krueger and Kumar (2004) and Lamo, Messina,
and Wasmer (2010). Both papers argue that vocationally-oriented schooling systems alter
workersbetween-sector mobility. This would explain the poor European growth perfor-
mance at a time where new technologies (and, therefore, new sectors) emerged (Krueger
and Kumar); it would also explain the persistence of unemployment after a sectorial shift
(Lamo, Messina, and Wasmer).
It is not easy to measure how vocational a given schooling program is. The Interna-
tional Standard Classication of Education cross-classies education programs by level
and type of education, each variable being (supposedly) independent. Table 1 focuses on
upper-secondary graduates in 2000. For each country we divide the workforce into people
who followed a vocational education hereafter, the specialists and people who followed
a general education hereafter, the generalists. Table 1 provides the unemployment rate
of each group as well as the overall unemployment rate.
There is substantial heterogeneity in the cross-section of countries. The percentage
of specialists is 56% on average and varies from 0% in the US to 95% in Germany; the
unemployment rate is 7.7% on average and goes from 1.9% in Luxembourg to 18.1% in the
Slovak Republic; the unemployment rate di¤erential between specialists and generalists is
0.9 percentage points on average and varies from -2.8 points in Australia to +5.7 points
in the Slovak Republic. Although specialists seem to be more exposed to unemployment
than generalists, there are no obvious relationships between the aggregate unemployment
rate and proportion of specialists on the one hand, and between the unemployment rate
di¤erential and proportion of specialists on the other hand.
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Country spec. proportion spec. u. rate gen. u. rate u. rate
Australia 0.267 0.039 0.067 0.060
Austria 0.885 0.033 0.032 0.033
Belgium 0.247 0.089 0.061 0.068
Czech Republic 0.556 0.090 0.065 0.079
Denmark 0.830 0.041 0.054 0.043
France 0.750 0.087 0.091 0.088
Germany 0.937 0.085 0.031 0.082
Greece 0.206 0.152 0.150 0.151
Hungary 0.514 0.076 0.048 0.062
Ireland 0.451 0.025 0.030 0.028
Italy 0.254 0.090 0.112 0.107
Luxembourg 0.653 0.020 0.018 0.019
Netherlands 0.567 0.022 0.032 0.027
New Zealand 0.728 0.055 0.045 0.052
Poland 0.515 0.192 0.151 0.172
Slovak Republic 0.503 0.210 0.152 0.181
Switzerland 0.866 0.023 0.033 0.024
Turkey 0.346 0.109 0.105 0.106
Mean 0.560 0.080 0.071 0.077
Table 1: Generalists, specialists and unemployment rates in the OECD, 2000. The
proportion of specialists is the proportion of people who followed a type B or a type C
education among upper-secondary graduates in the workforce. Source: OECD data and
authorscalculations.
The comparison of unemployment rates by education type is not very meaningful.
Minimizing the unemployment rate is not necessarily a good policy target: specialists
may be more widely unemployed, but they may also be more productive. Moreover, the
consideration of unemployment rates does not allow us to infer what would happen if a
signicant number of generalists decided to become specialists. What about equilibrium
e¤ects? Finally, unemployment rate di¤erentials partly rely on crowding-out e¤ects. For
instance, employers prefer to hire specialists who already know the job rather than gener-
alists who must rst of all be trained after recruitment. Crowding-out e¤ects have private
value you benet from a lower risk of unemployment by becoming a specialist , but no
social value someone must be hired anyway.
This paper makes two contributions. We o¤er a model of the labor market with
generalists and specialists where the proportion of specialists is endogenous. The model
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highlights various externalities of opposite signs. We then calibrate the model on the labor
market for upper-secondary graduates in 18 OECD countries. The e¢ cient proportion of
specialists is lower than the observed proportion.
We introduce a static two-sector model with matching frictions (Section 2). Jobs
are costly to create and the supply of vacancies responds to job protability through a
free-entry condition in each sector. The matching place is segmented by sector. Spe-
cialists participate in a single matching segment, whereas generalists participate in both
segments. Employers prefer specialists to generalists because specialists are more produc-
tive. Specialists, therefore, overcrowd generalists in job queues. The aggregate matching
technology displays asymmetric cross-type congestion e¤ects: specialists create congestion
for all including themselves , whereas generalists do not a¤ect the odds of employment
for the specialists. In this environment, being a generalist increases the scope of potential
occupations but it also reduces output and employment probability in a given sector.
Conversely, being a specialist narrows the scope of potential occupations but increases
output and employment probability in a given sector. These arguments do not depend
on the magnitude of the productivity premium and so remain true in the limit where the
productivity premium is zero.
We characterize the equilibrium with an exogenous proportion of specialists. We
highlight three e¤ects of such a proportion on the unemployment rate. The rst two e¤ects
imply that the proportion of specialists boosts job creation in each sector. On the one
hand, specialists are more productive than generalists and since the former come rst in
the job queues, rms post more vacancies per job seeker in each sector. On the other hand,
generalists exacerbate employerscoordination problems on the job market: generalists
may benet from multiple job o¤ers, but only one o¤er is accepted.1 An increase in
the proportion of specialists reduces the problem raised by generalists and so provides
incentive to job creation. According to the third e¤ect, an increase in the proportion of
specialists reduces matching e¢ ciency because specialists seek jobs in only one sector.
The combination of these three e¤ects implies that the proportion of specialists has an
ambiguous impact on overall unemployment. Numeric simulations based on a calibration
of the French labor market for upper-secondary graduates reveal that the relationship
between the unemployment rate and proportion of specialists is U-shaped.
We then endogenize the proportion of specialists (Section 3). We consider two distinct
cases. In the rst people self-select in type of education. They compare the di¤erential
return on becoming a specialist with the di¤erential schooling cost. In the second a
benevolent planner chooses the proportion of specialists, accounting for the e¤ects on
1This externality typically arises in matching models with multiple applications (see, e.g., Albrecht,
Gautier, and Vroman 2006).
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job creation. We compare the resulting allocations and examine the various sources
of ine¢ ciency. Ex post rent-sharing implies that people do not internalize the e¤ects
discussed above. In addition, there may be increasing returns to specialization, which
may lead to multiple equilibria (Proposition 2 provides a su¢ cient condition leading to
the existence of three equilibria). The magnitude of the various externalities depends on
the productivity di¤erential between generalists and specialists.
We nally calibrate our model on the labor market for upper-secondary graduates in
OECD countries (Section 4). We specify a matching technology and, for each country, we
calibrate the model to reproduce the proportion of specialists and unemployment rates
for each group as given in Table 1. We consider two distinct values of the productivity
premium: 0 and 20%. These values provide extreme bounds to wage di¤erentials across
education types among upper-secondary graduates.
It turns out that self-selection is always ine¢ cient. In each country, too many people
become specialists. Reducing the proportion of specialists to its e¢ cient level can produce
signicant employment gains: the unemployment rate would be reduced by 1.8 points
when the productivity premium is zero to 1.1 points when the productivity premium
is 20% on average. The Pigouvian tax on vocational education amounts to between
0.5% and 5% of worker output when the productivity premium is zero. This roughly
corresponds to between 20% and 100% of the yearly earnings of a secondary educated. In
France for instance, the tax is 2.5% and thus represents half the yearly wage.
We also perform a similar analysis for tertiary graduates. The results are qualitatively
unchanged: the society would fare better if fewer people became specialists. However, the
magnitude of ine¢ ciency is not large and so the actual allocation is close to the e¢ cient
allocation. In addition, the proportion of specialists is too low in one or even two countries
(Austria and Switzerland).
The trade-o¤ between specialized and general skills has already been put forward in
matching models. Wasmer (2006) examines the case of on-the-job training; Mukoyama
and Sahin (2006) and Decreuse and Granier (2009) focus on education. For this trade-o¤
to make sense workers with specialized skills must have an advantage in some dimension.
Otherwise, people would have no reason to invest in specialized skills. This is whyWasmer
(2006) and Decreuse and Granier (2009) also assume that specialized skills are more
productive than general skills. This assumption is compatible with the view whereby
specialized skills are more productive but also more risky (see, e.g., Grossman and Shapiro
1982; and Acemoglu and Shimer 2000). Another interpretation is the following. People
with general skills start with a productivity disadvantage. However, they learn faster than
specialists and eventually become more productive. Unfortunately, learning takes time
and so a large part of the benets due to learning will not be captured by the current but
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rather by the subsequent employers. From the perspective of the rst employer, therefore,
a generalist is viewed as less productive than a specialist.
We shed light on a complementary margin of the trade-o¤ between general and spe-
cialized skills. Generalists have access to a wider range of o¤ers than specialists but
employers prefer to hire specialists. In other words, generalists participate in several job
queues at a time and specialists participate in a single queue where they can use the fast
line. Of course, there must be a reason why employers prefer the specialists. Special-
ists, therefore, enjoy a productivity premium over generalists in our model. However, the
mechanisms we emphasize still hold when the productivity premium is zero a case we
consider throughout the paper. In addition, we focus on normative implications, whereas
previous papers do not.
This paper refers to the literature that studies the e¢ ciency of educational investments
when the labor market is frictional. Moen (1999) examines a model in which education
improves ones skills as well as ones ranking in the job queue. The latter e¤ect resembles
our matching technology where specialists crowd out generalists in each sector. Laing,
Palivos, and Wang (1995) and Burdett and Smith (2002) provide models in which the
number of jobs increases with the magnitude of educational investment. In our model,
similarly, the sectorial ratio of vacancy to unemployed increases with the proportion of
specialists. In the multi-dimensional skill model of Charlot, Decreuse, and Granier (2005),
workers invest in education not only to improve their chance of being employed, but also to
raise their outside opportunities during wage negotiation. This latter return to education
is not matched by a social gain and workers overinvest in education.2 What is new in
our approach is that the various externalities we put forward do not apply to the human
capital investment level but, rather, to the divide of investment between specialized and
general skills.
The idea whereby the provision of general skills is insu¢ cient echoes a number of con-
tributions in the literature on training investments. Stevens (1994) introduces the notion
of transferable skills. These skills can only be used in a proportion of the di¤erent available
jobs. Stevens argues that there is an underprovision of transferable skills by employers.
Acemoglu (1997) provides a search model in which part of the gains from general training
are captured by future employers. He also concludes that there is underinvestment in gen-
eral training. Smits (2007) promotes a di¤erent view. She distinguishes industry-specic
skills from generic skills (that have a higher value elsewhere in the economy). Workers
want more generic skills than is socially optimal, while rms prefer industry-specic skills.
2Models of educational investment with search frictions also feature externalities that cannot be related
with externalities reported here. For instance, Charlot and Decreuse (2005, 2010) focus on composition
externalities created by the self-selection in education of heterogenous agents.
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2 Model with exogenous proportion of specialists
2.1 Environment
The model is static. There are two productive sectors indexed by j = 1; 2. They both
produce a nal good. Both goods are sold in competitive markets; they are perfectly
substitutable in individual preferences.
There is a continuum of individuals whose size is normalized to unity. All persons start
nonemployed and need to nd a job. People di¤er in type: they are either specialists
(indexed by s) or generalists (indexed by g). Specialists can work in a single sector,
whereas generalists can work in both. Once employed, type-i agents produce yi, with
i = g; s. Let yg = y and ys = (1 + )y, where   0 is the skill-specic premium. The
proportion of specialists is x 2 [0; 1], while the generalist proportion is 1  x. Specialists
are equally shared between the two sectors.
There is a continuum of rms in each sector. Each rm is endowed with one job, which
can be either active or inactive. Active jobs cost c and need to be lled before production
starts. Inactive jobs cost nothing. The mass number of active jobs in each sector is nj.
Active jobs and job seekers search for each other. Once a worker is hired, he starts
producing and output is split between the worker and the rm. Let  2 (0; 1) denote
the workers share. Output sharing implies that rms prefer to hire specialists because
rms obtain more prots with such workers. We also assume that (1   )y > c; this
condition ensures that rms create a non-trivial number of jobs when the workforce is
entirely composed of generalists that is, x = 0.
The key innovation of the model relies on the matching side. Hiring for the various
types of workers usually depends on a matching technology whose inputs are the di¤erent
numbers of job seekers and vacancies. The matching technology features congestion ef-
fects: expanding individuals or jobs reduces the matching odds for individuals or jobs of
the same type. The crucial point is whether the matching technology displays cross-type
congestion e¤ects. When the search place is perfectly segmented by worker and job type,
workers or jobs of a given type do not create congestion e¤ects on workers or jobs of the
other type. When search is random, cross-type e¤ects are symmetric: at given number of
jobs, an increase in the number of workers of a given type reduces the matching probabil-
ity for both types. Workers are equally likely to get a job and the number of recruitments
accruing to a given type of worker is proportional to their share among the job seekers.
We make three assumptions. First, the matching place is segmented by sector. Second,
specialists participate in a single market segment, whereas generalists participate in both
at no extra cost. Third, cross-type congestion e¤ects are assymetric: specialists crowd
out generalists in each sector.
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Market segmentation means that a worker seeking a sector-1 job does not create
congestion e¤ects for workers seeking a sector-2 job. In sector j, the number of meetings
Mj between unemployed and vacancies obeys the following meeting technology:
Mj = m (uj; nj) ; (1)
where uj and nj are, respectively, the number of job seekers and vacancies in sector j.
The number of job seekers is uj = x=2 + 1   x = 1   x=2; this number decreases with
the proportion of specialists. The technology m is twice continuously derivable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave in each argument, has constant returns to scale, and
satises the boundary properties m(u; 0) = m(0; n) = 0, m(u;1) = u and m(1; n) = n
for all u; n  0. Hereafter j = nj=uj = nj=(1   x=2) is market-j tightness, while
z = (x=2)= (1   x=2) is the ratio of specialists to generalists in both sectors. The mean
probability of receiving an o¤er from a given sector is () = m(1; ); the mean probability
of contacting a worker in a given sector is () = ()=. We use  () = 0()=
() 2 (0; 1) to denote the elasticity of the matching technology with respect to vacancies.
In each sector job o¤ers are not equally shared between the job seekers: specialists
overcrowd generalists in the job queues. The number of meetings for the specialists is
Mjs = m (x=2; nj) : (2)
Generalists obtain the following residual number of meetings:
Mjg = m (1  x=2; nj) m (x=2; nj) : (3)
Let js be the probability that a specialist in sector j receives a job o¤er. We have
js =
Mjs
x=2
= m (1; j=z) =  (j=z) : (4)
Similarly, the probability that a generalist receives a job o¤er from sector j is
jg =
Mjg
1  x =
 (j)  z (j=z)
1  z : (5)
Lemma Properties of offer probabilities
The o¤er probabilities js  s(j; z) and jg  g(j; z) are such that:
(i) both js and jg increase with market tightness ;
(ii) both js and jg decrease with the sector-specic proportion of specialists z.
Proof Part (i). The function  is strictly increasing and js increases with j. The
derivative of jg with respect to j has the sign of 
0(j)   0(j=z). This sign is
positive because the function  is strictly concave and z is lower than 1.
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Part (ii). The function  is strictly increasing and so js decreases with z. The
derivative of jg with respect to z yields
@jg
@z
=
  (=z) + (1  z) 
z
0 (=z) +  ()
(1  z)2
= g (z) (1  z) 2 :
However, g (1) = 0 and
g0 (z) =   
z2
(1  z)00 (=z) > 0:
Therefore, g (z) < g (1) = 0 and gz < 0 for all z < 1.
An increase in market tightness benets both groups of workers. This is not only
true for the specialists who do not su¤er from job competition by the generalists, but
also for the generalists who obtain the residual number of o¤ers. Similarly, an increase
in proportion of specialists negatively a¤ects job o¤ers for both groups. Job competition
expands for specialists, whereas generalists move back in the job queues.
In each sector the meeting technology reproduces the salient features of the directed
search model with worker heterogeneity when all workers search for similar jobs (see, e.g.,
the separating equilibrium in Shi 2002). Unlike such a model, job o¤ers do not always lead
to employment relationships in our setting because generalists seek jobs in two sectors.
Specialists receive one job o¤er at most. Meeting and matching probabilities coincide
as a result and
pjs = js = (j=z): (6)
Generalists may receive two o¤ers, one from each sector. Their matching probability is
pg = 1g + 2g   1g2g: (7)
From the rmsperspective, the probability of recruiting a specialist is
js =
Mjs
nj
=
m (1; j=z)
j=z
=  (j=z) : (8)
If a generalist receives two o¤ers, then he must choose between them. When o¤ers are
the same (which will be the case), he ips a coin with 50-50 probability. The probability
of recruiting a generalist is
jg =
Mjg
nj
 
1   jg=2

= [ (j)   (j=z)]
 
1   jg=2

: (9)
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Workers expected utility U ij depends on workers type i and sector of occupation j. The
rms expected prot j is sector-specic. We have
U ij = pjiyi; (10)
j =  c+ js (1  ) ys + jg (1  ) y: (11)
Free entry implies 1 = 2 = 0. The following equations obtain:
c =

js (1 + ) + jg

(1  ) y (12)
for j = 1; 2. The free-entry condition determines sector-specic tightness as a function of
the proportion of specialists x and the other sector tightness  j.
Before we solve the model we briey comment two assumptions. First, the model is
static. This has pros and cons. On the plus side, the proportion of specialists among
unemployed workers does not depend on tightness. Generalists and specialists have het-
erogenous employment probabilities and so the employment probability di¤erential be-
tween a generalist and a specialist depends on tightness (in a non-trivial way). Changes
in tightness, therefore, modify the employment probability di¤erential, and, by construc-
tion, the proportion of each group among the unemployed. Taking this argument into
account would complicate the resolution without adding much in return. On the minus
side, unemployment only depends on the matching probability. In a dynamic framework,
unemployment exposure would depend on matching probability and job loss probability.
It is likely that education type determines not only matching odds, but also the job-keeping
probability. In the same vein, education type may also a¤ect job-to-job transitions.
Second, we assume output sharing. This can result from bilateral Nash bargaining
over match surplus. In this case,  is workersbargaining power. However, generalists
may receive two o¤ers. We implicitly assume that generalists must choose an o¤er before
the wage contract is signed. Firm owners may well make promises, but there are no com-
mitment mechanisms that ensure the wage promise holds. Ex post rent-sharing results.
We could consider alternative wage rules. Wage bargaining could take place between
three parties. Bertrand competition could result when there are two o¤ers. Both cases
would imply that generalists should be able to command higher wage to output ratios
than specialists.
2.2 Equilibrium
A symmetric equilibrium is a positive number ^ that solves the following equation:
c
(1  ) y =  (=z) (1 + ) + ( ()   (=z))

1   ()  z (=z)
1  z =2

: (FE)
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Hereafter, we only focus on symmetric equilibria. Therefore, jg = g, js = s, jg = g,
and js = s.
Proposition 1 Properties of an equilibrium with exogenous education
Let x 2 (0; 1). The following statements hold:
(i) There exists a unique equilibrium with exogenous education;
(ii) Equilibrium tightness ^ increases with y, , and 1   ; it also increases with
proportion of specialists x.
Proof (i) Let  : R+  (0; 1)! R be such that
 (; z) =  (=z) (1 + ) + ( ()   (=z)) 1  g (; z) =2  c(1  ) y : (13)
An equilibrium is such that (^; z) = 0. The function  is continuously derivable in
. In addition, (0; z) = 1 +    c=((1   )y) > 0, (1; z) =  c= ((1  ) y) < 0
and
 (; z) =
0 (=z)
z

+ g (; z) =2

+ 0 ()

1  g (; z) =2

  ( ()   (=z)) @g (; z)
@
=2: (14)
The rst two terms are negative because  is strictly decreasing. The Lemma shows
that the third term is negative as well. Therefore, (; z) < 0 and there exists a
unique equilibrium.
(ii) The comparative statics with respect to 1  , y, and  immediately follow. As
for the proportion of specialists per sector z, equilibrium tightness ^  ^(z; :) is such
that ^(0; :) solves
 () (1   () =2) = c
(1  ) y ; (15)
whereas ^ (1; :) solves
 () (1 + ) =
c
(1  ) y : (16)
In addition,
z (; z) =  

z2
0 (=z)
 
+ g (; z) =2
  ( ()   (=z)) @g (; z)
@z
=2: (17)
The rst term is positive because  is decreasing. The Lemma implies that the
second term is also positive. Therefore, z (; z) > 0. The implicit function theorem
implies bz (z; :) =  z (; z)
 (; z)
> 0: (18)
Since dz=dx > 0, the proof is closed.
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In the usual working of the free-entry condition, congestion increases with tightness,
which ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium. This logic also applies here because
more jobs in a given sector reduce the matching probability for each. In addition expand-
ing the number of jobs in a particular sector reduces expected prots in the other sector
because generalists there have more chances of receiving multiple o¤ers.3 Both e¤ects
lead to a negative impact of sector-specic tightness on job protability.
The productivity premium  and output amount accruing to rms owner (1  ) y
make jobs more protable. The equilibrium number of rms increases as a result.
The proportion of specialists has a positive impact on market tightness. Two e¤ects are
involved. First, increasing x is good for job creation because the odds of matching with a
high-productive worker are higher. This e¤ect is all the higher in so far as the productivity
di¤erential  is large; it vanishes when  = 0. Second, increasing x means generalists
receive fewer o¤ers. The Lemma shows that g decreases with x because specialists
overcrowd generalists in job queues. The number of people who receive multiple o¤ers
goes down as a result. The implicit coordination problem is smaller for rmsowners and
they create more jobs. The magnitude of this e¤ect does not depend on the productivity
premium. The e¤ect, therefore, survives when  = 0.
We nally remark that the function ^ is dened for a non-trivial proportion of spe-
cialists x 2 (0; 1). The function admits well-dened limits and so we denote ^(0) =
limx!0 ^(x) and ^(1) = limx!1 ^(x) in the rest of the paper.
2.3 Beveridge curve and proportion of specialists
Let us, ug, and u denote, respectively, the specialist, generalist, and overall unemployment
rates. We have
us = us (; x) = 1  s (; x) ; (19)
ug = ug (; x) =

1  g (; z (x))
2
; (20)
u = u (; x) = x [1  s (; z (x))] + (1  x)

1  g (; z (x))
2
: (21)
The unemployment rate di¤erential between specialists and generalists may be positive
or negative. Specialists benet from a higher job o¤er probability in each sector. But
generalists pursue jobs on both sectors and receive twice the number of o¤ers they have
in a given sector.
3There is a similar e¤ect in the matching model with homogenous workers and multiple applications
of Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006). A new job increases not only congestion in the usual meaning
but it also increases the chances that a contacted worker receives another o¤er.
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The overall unemployment rate is the weighted average of group-specic unemploy-
ment rates. We have
u = 1  (2  x) () + (1  x)g (; z (x))2 : (22)
Unemployment rate is one minus the employment probability. In each sector, 1   x=2
workers seek for jobs. The mean job o¤er probability is  (). The total number of
o¤ers received by the unemployed is (2  x) (). These o¤ers do not always lead to
employment relationships because generalists may receive two o¤ers this event occurs
with probability g
2.
Group-specic unemployment rates as well as the overall unemployment rate respond
to changes in tightness and proportion of specialists. Changes in the latter proportion
alter the relationship between the unemployment rate and (sector-specic) tightness be-
cause generalists receive o¤ers from both sectors. Consequently, the unemployment rate
increases with the proportion of specialists at a given vacancy to job seeker ratio. For in-
stance, if the proportion of specialists x = 1, then the unemployment rate is u = 1  ().
If the proportion of specialists is 0, then the unemployment rate is u = (1   ())2 <
1   (). The matching process becomes less e¢ cient as the proportion of specialists
increases.
[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 depicts a kind of Beveridge curve. Unemployment rate lies on the horizontal
axis, whereas sector-specic tightness lies on the vertical axis. The curve is decreasing
and convex, with u(0; x) = 1 and u(1; x) = 0 as usual. Figure 1 also depicts equilibrium
tightness  = ^(x), a straight line. The equilibrium unemployment rate results from the
curve intersection, that is u = u(^(x); x). An increase in the proportion of specialists has
two e¤ects. On the one hand, it reduces the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The Bev-
eridge curve moves rightward as a result, which tends to increase unemployment. On the
other hand, it moves equilibrium tightness up, which tends to reduce the unemployment
rate. The overall impact of the proportion of specialists is ambiguous.
2.4 Parameterization
Here our purpose is to calibrate the French labor market of upper-secondary graduates in
2000 with a special focus on generalists and specialists. ISCED data organize horizontal
di¤erentiation of educational attainments. These data rank educational attainments into
six levels (1 to 6) that go from pre-primary schooling to research. At each schooling level,
there are three di¤erent types of education: from A (general) to C (vocational).
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The specialists are upper-secondary educated who followed a vocational program (B
or C). The generalists are upper-secondary educated who followed a general program (A).
The specialist unemployment rate was about 8.7%, while the generalist unemployment
rate was about 9.1%. The proportion of specialists was x0 = 75%. The corresponding
proportion of specialists in each sector is z0 = 60%.
We rst match the theoretical unemployment rates us and ug with the empirical values.
We need a matching technology with (at least) a free parameter for this purpose. The
matching technology must satisfy all the assumptions listed in Sub-section 2.1. We use a
variant of the urn-ball matching technology suggested by Albrecht et al (2004):  () =
1   [1   (=)(1   e =)], with  > 0.4 The authors derive this technology from the
standard urn-ball model extended to the case of multiple applications. In this setting,
parameter  is the number of applications that each worker makes. By analogy (and by
analogy only), parameter  can be interpreted in our model as the number of applications
that job seekers make on a given search market. Specialists, therefore, send  applications
in the only market they participate in, whereas generalists send 2 applications.
We nd the values of  and  such that
us = 1   (=z0; ) = 8:7%;
ug = [1  ( (; )  z0 (=z0; )) = (1  z0)]2 = 9:1%;
where the dependence vis-à-vis  has been made explicit. We denote the solutions  and
.
In a second step we derive tightness from the working of the model with exogenous
education. We now specify the rest of the parameters. Output y is normalized to unity.
The productivity di¤erential  = 0. This gure allows us to show that the working of the
model does not depend on the fact that specialists are more productive than generalists.
What matters is that specialists overcrowd generalists in job queues. The gure  = 0
is somewhat arbitrary and so we will consider alternative values below. Workersoutput
share is  = 0:5.
We use the free-entry condition and compute the value of the job creation cost c such
that ^(0:6) = . We have
c
(1  )y = 
 
=z0; 

(1 + ) +
 

 
; 
    =z0;  1  g  ; z0;  =2 : (FE)
Table 2 summarizes the parameter set.
4The CobbDouglas technology su¤ers from two drawbacks. On the one hand, it does not satisfy all
the assumptions listed in Sub-section 2.1. In particular matching probabilities may exceed one. On the
other hand, the calibration exercise would require a particular elasticity of the matching technology in
each country to be set. Changes in scale parameters for instance would not allow us to simultaneously
match the specialist and generalist unemployment rates.
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y   x0 z0  c
1:0 0:0 0:5 75% 60% 1:73 20:7%
Table 2: Parameters of the baseline simulation. Parameters y, ,  are arbitrarily xed; x0
and z0 are observed;  and c are chosen to match the unemployment rates of both education
groups.
The panel of Figures 2 depicts the equilibrium relationships between the specialist,
generalist, and global unemployment rates on the one hand, and the productivity di¤er-
ential  and the proportion of specialists x on the other hand. Figure 2a compares the
various unemployment rates when the proportion of specialists varies from 0 to 100%.
The generalist unemployment rate ug is about 9% and varies very little with the propor-
tion of specialists. The direct negative impact of the proportion of specialists on the job
o¤er probability is actually compensated by the positive e¤ect of such a proportion on
market tightness. The specialist unemployment rate is much more volatile and strongly
increases with the proportion of specialists. This pattern reects increased congestion
for the specialist at given tightness. The global unemployment rate is U-shaped. The
positive e¤ect of x on tightness dominates at low values of the proportion of specialists; it
is dominated at higher values by the decline in matching e¢ ciency. Figure 2a implies that
strong employment gains can result from a decrease in proportion of specialists. Starting
from 75% and decreasing to 40% leads to a reduction in unemployment rate from 8.8%
to about 6%.
[Insert Panel of Figures 2]
Figures 2b to 2d separately focus on each unemployment rate and examine their sen-
sitivity to the productivity di¤erential. The specialist unemployment rate increases with
the proportion of specialists whatever the value of . The generalist unemployment rate
may increase or decrease with the proportion of specialists depending on the productivity
di¤erential. When the productivity di¤erential is low, tightness does not signicantly
increase with the proportion of specialists, while generalists move back in job queues.
Conversely, the rise in tightness is stronger when the productivity di¤erential is large,
and the generalist unemployment rate decreases with the proportion of specialists. The
relationship between the overall unemployment rate and the proportion of specialists is
always U-shaped. This statement also holds when the productivity di¤erential is zero.
Generalists still deteriorate tightness in this case as they exacerbate rmscoordination
problems.
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3 Endogenous proportion of specialists
We endogenize the proportion of specialists x. Individuals are ex ante homogenous and
must enter a schooling program prior to searching for a job. Specialized skills cost s,
whereas general skills cost g. Such costs may di¤er for various reasons. Cost hetero-
geneity may reect underlying di¤erences in education e¤ort. Specialized programs may
involve a set of skills that were little used beforehand. Conversely, general programs
may be more abstract. They may also be due to di¤erences in non-monetary gains as-
sociated with each type of education. For instance, a general education may provide
non-productive skills like access to culture in this case g < 0. Social norms may favor
one type of education versus another, irrespective of economic returns.5
We introduce such costs for the purpose of calibration. The working of the model does
not require di¤erential schooling costs: a non-trivial proportion of specialists can result
as long as the productivity premium accruing to specialists is not too large. However,
matching the model with actual data as displayed by Table 1 leaves us with a simple
problem. On average, generalists are less exposed to unemployment than specialists; but
the specialist unemployment rate is lower than the generalist one in a few countries. In
such countries, specialists have higher chances of employment and they are paid better.
The only way to derive the actual proportion of specialists as an equilibrium outcome
of our model is to specify a positive di¤erential schooling cost of becoming a specialist.6
In addition, we calibrate the model with a small number of parameters. The di¤erential
schooling cost will be one of the only free parameters.7
We consider two cases. First, we assume that individuals self-select in education on the
basis of the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist and the corresponding di¤erential
cost. Second, we assume that the Government sets the proportion of specialists. The
Governments goal is to maximize social welfare. This case allows us to characterize the
degree and the direction of ine¢ ciency when people select themselves.
5People cannot choose nonparticipation. We implicitly assume that the return to nonparticipation is
lower than the return to participation net of schooling cost whatever the type of education.
6This property is due to the assumption whereby the wage is a xed proportion of output, which, in
turn, implies that specialists receive higher wages. A di¤erent wage setting could allow generalists to be
paid more.
7When the specialist unemployment rate is larger than the generalist one, we can consider an alter-
native calibration strategy: compute the productivity premium such that the observed allocation is the
decentralized allocation of the model without schooling cost di¤erential. It turns out that the predicted
allocation with no productivity premium is very close to this conguration.
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3.1 Self-selection in education type
The equilibrium proportion of specialists is determined by comparing the net returns to
each type of skills. A worker invests in general skills if U s   s < U g   g. Conversely,
he becomes a specialist if U s s > U g  g. If U s s = U g  g, then he is indi¤erent
vis-à-vis the two types of skills and ips a coin.
The di¤erential return U = U s   U g is
U  U (; x) =  (=z)  (1 + ) y  
"
1 

1   ()  z (=z)
1  z
2#
y: (23)
A marginal change in market tightness has the following e¤ect:
@ (U)
@
=  (1 + ) y
0 (=z)
z
>0
  2
1  z (
0 ()  0 (=z))  1  g (; z)
<0
y: (24)
Both the return to becoming a specialist and the return to becoming a generalist in-
crease with the rise in tightness. Since U = 0 when  = 0 and U = y when 
approaches innity, the positive e¤ect tends to dominate the negative one. However, at
given tightness, the global e¤ect is ambiguous.
In the non-frictional case that is,  tends to innity a specialist is sure to nd a job.
Why would someone become a generalist when the wage is lower? This reasoning suggests
that matching frictions provide incentive to acquire general rather than specialized skills.
In another setting where each person allocates educational investment between adaptabil-
ity and specialized skills, Decreuse and Granier (2009) also argue that matching frictions
direct skill investment towards general skills; they are in line with Rosen (1983) who ex-
plains that the incentives to specialization are closely related to skill use: the return to
investment in a particular skill is increasing in its subsequent rate of utilization.
It turns out that the non-frictional case provides only a partial explanation. When
tightness is nite, being a specialist is also attractive. If the chance of being o¤ered a
job is very small in each sector, then being put in front of the job queue becomes very
important even more than participating in several queues at a time. From this perspec-
tive, matching frictions provide incentive to become a specialist. This e¤ect arises only
in our setting where the matching technology displays cross-type asymmetric congestion
e¤ects.
A marginal change in sector-specic proportion of specialists z has the following e¤ect:
@ (U)
@z
=   (=z) (=z)
z2
 (1 + ) y
<0
+
2 (1   (=z)) (=z)
(1  z)2
 
1  g (; z)

y:
>0
(25)
Both returns are negatively impacted. On the one hand, more specialists means increased
congestion for them. This is a stabilizer e¤ect: increasing the proportion of specialists
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tends to reduce the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist. On the other hand, having
more specialists means there are fewer jobs per generalist job seeker. This is a multiplier
e¤ect because this e¤ect tends to increase the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist.
There are no reasons to believe that the stabilizer e¤ect should dominate the multiplier
e¤ect. The magnitude of such e¤ects depends on . Consider for instance the limit cases
where z is zero and when z is one. If z is zero, then we have
U (; 0) =  (1 + ) y   1  (1   ())2 y > 0: (26)
If z is one, then we have
U (; 1) =  () (1 + ) y   1  (1  (1   ()) ())2 y: (27)
Taking the di¤erence, we obtain
U (; 1) U (; 0) = y   1 + + 2 (1  ) + 2  (1 + ) ; (28)
with  =  () and  =  (). When  is small, the di¤erence is negative and the stabilizer
e¤ect dominates as the intuition suggests. However, when  is large, the di¤erence is
positive, and the multiplier e¤ect dominates.
In this discussion we separately consider changes in  and z. A change in z also a¤ects
market tightness. In turn, the change in market tightness modies the di¤erential return
to becoming a specialist. We now examine these equilibrium considerations.
3.2 Equilibrium with self-selection in education type
A symmetric equilibrium with self-selection in education type is a vector (; z) that
satises
c
(1  ) y =  (
=z) (1 + ) + ( ()   (=z)) 1  g (; z) =2 ; (FE)
 (=z) (1 + ) 
h
1   1  g (; z)2i
8><>:
 = (y) if z = 0
= = (y) if z 2 (0; 1)
 = (y) if z = 1
; (OS)
where   s   g.
An interior equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium with self-selection in which z 2
(0; 1).
Proposition 2 Properties of equilibrium with self-selection
A. Assume that U(^ (0) ; 0) > =(y) > U(^ (1) ; 1). The following statements
hold:
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(i) there exists an interior equilibrium with
U
b (z) ; zb0 (z) <  Uz b (z) ; z ; and (29)
(ii) dz=d < 0 and d=d > 0, dz=d Q 0 and d=d > 0, dz=d Q 0 and
d=dc < 0:
B. Assume that U(^ (0) ; 0) < = (y) < U(^ (1) ; 1). The following statement
holds:
(iii) there are at least three equilibria (0; z; 1) with z 2 (0; 1) and
U
b (z) ; zb0 (z) >  Uz b (z) ; z : (30)
Proof Part (i). In the proof of Proposition 1 we characterize the implicit function ^ 
^ (z; ; c) dened by the free-entry condition (FE). The equilibrium, therefore, is
such that
U
b (z) ; z   if z = 0;
U
b (z) ; z =  if z 2 (0; 1) ;
U
b (z) ; z   if z = 1:
The result follows from the fact that U is di¤erentiable with respect to z.
Part (ii). We know that z is implicitly dened by U(^ (z; c; ) ; z; ) = ,
while  = ^ (z; c; ). Inequality (29) implies that either U < 0 or U  0 and
Uz < 0. Consider any parameter p 2 (; c; ). The implicit function theorem
implies
dz
dp
=  U (
; z; ) ^p (z; c; ) + Up (
; z; )  d=dp
U (
; z; ) ^z (z; c; ) + Uz (
; z; )
; (31)
d
dp
= ^p (z
; c; ) + ^z (z; c; )
dz
dp
: (32)
As ^ = 0 and U = 0, dz=d > 0, which implies d
=d > 0. As ^c < 0
and Uc = 0, dz=dc has the sign of  U(^ (z; c; ) ; z; ). This sign can be
positive or negative as long as inequality (29) holds. Then,
d
dc
= bc   bz Ubc
Ubz +Uz = bc UzUbz +Uz : (33)
If U  0, inequality (29) implies Uz < 0 and d=dc < 0. If U < 0, then
dz=dc > 0, and equation (32) implies that d=dc < 0. A similar reasoning leads
to dz=d ambiguous, whereas d=d > 0.
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Part (iii). The fact that z = 0 and z = 1 are equilibria follows from the denition
of a symmetric equilibrium. From the di¤erentiability of U , there exists z 2 (0; 1)
such that U(^ (z) ; z) =  and inequality (30) holds.
Part A provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a stableequilibrium. This
condition states that the di¤erential return to specialization is larger than the di¤erential
schooling cost when none get specialized and lower than the di¤erential cost when everyone
is a specialist. Consequently, there is at least one non-trivial proportion of specialists such
thatU = =(y). Moreover, the interior equilibrium (if unique) or one of the equilibria
(if multiple equilibria) is such that the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist decreases
with the proportion of specialists in the neighborhood of equilibrium.
Stability can be achieved by two di¤erent means. The proportion of specialists exerts
two kinds of impacts on the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist. The direct e¤ect
Uz may either be positive or negative we discuss this in the previous sub-section. The
indirect e¤ect U^z transits through the change in tightness. The stability condition
(29) requires that the sum of the direct and indirect e¤ects is negative.
An increase in the cost of acquiring specialized skills has non-ambiguous e¤ects. The
proportion of specialists falls and tightness decreases on each market as a result. This
strengthens the direct e¤ect and the proportion of specialists further decreases. This
result has a direct implication. Suppose some external information tells the true value of
x in the workforce. Suppose also that we are in the case of part A of Proposition 2 that
is, U(^ (0) ; 0) > =(y) > U(^ (1) ; 1). We can always nd the value of  such
that x is an equilibrium outcome. We use this property in Sub-section 3.4.
The comparative statics with respect to the job creation cost c and the productivity
premium  are ambiguous. Consider an increase in job creation cost c. In line with
Proposition 1, rms create more jobs per seeker and tightness increases. Matching frictions
become less severe in each sector. However (as discussed in Sub-section 3.1), matching
frictions have no clear-cut e¤ects on the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist. The
equilibrium proportion of specialists increases when such a return goes up and decreases
when the return goes down. An increase in the productivity premium  leads to similar
discussions. Overall, the proportion of specialists is much less likely to decrease since 
has a direct positive impact on the di¤erential return to becoming a specialist.
Part B provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence of multiple equilibria. Such
equilibria are the two extreme situations where there are no specialists, everyone becomes
a specialist, plus an interior equilibrium. The interior equilibrium is unstable as a
marginal increase in the proportion of specialists would increase the di¤erential return to
becoming a specialist. Multiple equilibria may arise for two reasons. On the one hand,
increasing the proportion of specialists at given tightness does not necessarily reduce the
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di¤erential return to becoming a specialist. The multiplier e¤ect discussed above may
dominate the stabilizer e¤ect. On the other hand, the interaction between job creation
and schooling choices implies that there may be increasing social returns to specialization:
expanding the proportion of specialists provides incentive to job creation along the lines
of Proposition 1. Meanwhile, the rise in tightness promotes specialized skills.8
When multiple equilibria result, high-tightness and high-proportion of specialists equi-
libria coexist with low-tightness and low-proportion of specialists equilibria. Equilibria
cannot easily be Pareto-ranked because the proportion of specialists reduces the e¢ ciency
of the matching technology. Unemployment, similarly, may be higher or lower in the high-
proportion of specialists equilibrium.
3.3 Optimal proportion of specialists
We now examine the case where the proportion of specialists is decided by a benevolent
planner who maximizes social welfare. However, the planner does not choose the whole
allocation. Firms create jobs in each market and so the planner accounts for the impacts
of the proportion of specialists on job creation. In other words, the planner su¤ers not
only from the same information imperfections as workers and rm owners do, but he also
takes as given the potential ine¢ ciency of job creation decisions. This assumption allows
us to focus on the particular externalities conveyed by education type.
The planners goal is
max
x2[0;1]

 =

xs(^(z(x))); z(x))(1 + ) + (1  x)[1  (1  g(b(z (x)); z (x)))2]  xy

:
(34)
Taking the derivative of 
 with respect to x gives
d

dx
= s (1 + ) 

1   1  g2  y (35)
+x

@s
@z
+
@s
@
0 (z)

(1 + ) z0 (x) + 2 (1  x)  1  g@g@z + @g@ 0 (z)

z0 (x) :
The rst line is the private di¤erential return to becoming a specialist U (normalized by
y) net of di¤erential schooling cost. The second line accounts for the various externalities
discussed in the paper. Namely, the planner takes into account that changes in the
proportion of specialists a¤ect job creation and matching probabilities of both groups.
It follows that a marginal change in x can improve welfare in equilibrium with self-
8This mechanism borrows from Acemoglu (1996), Burdett and Smith (2002), and Laing, Palivos, and
Wang (1996). All these papers analyze investments in education.
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selection. We have
d

dx

x=x
= x

@s
@z
+
@s
@
0 (z)

(1 + ) z0 (x)+2 (1  x)  1  g@g@z + @g@ 0 (z)

z0 (x) :
(36)
The direction of the change is a priori ambiguous.
In the particular case where  = 0, the planners goal reduces to
max
x2[0;1]

 = 1  u
b (z (x)) ; z (x)  x
y
: (37)
The goal is to maximize employment reduced by the overall di¤erential cost of education
.
The extent of ine¢ ciency crucially depends on the magnitude of congestion e¤ects
displayed by the aggregate matching technology. When workers do not create congestion
e¤ects, the decentralized allocation is constrained e¢ cient. To illustrate this argument,
suppose that the elasticity  is arbitrarily small. The probability of receiving an o¤er
is then roughly the same for the specialists and the generalists; let us call it m. The
di¤erential return of becoming a specialist is U = m(1 + )y   [1  (1 m)2]y. The
derivative of the planners goal with respect to x becomes d
=dx = (U   )=(y).
The planners choice, therefore, coincides with the decentralized allocation: either none
(U < ) or everyone becomes a specialist (U > ).
4 Are there too many specialists in OECD countries?
We calibrate our model on OECD data at country level. We focus on upper-secondary
graduates. We match the actual allocation with the decentralized allocation predicted by
our model. We then compare the actual allocation with the e¢ cient allocation. We also
perform a similar analysis for tertiary graduates.
Before we proceed to the calibration, we want to highlight the implicit assumptions
behind this exercise. We rst assume that people who followed a general education and
people who followed a vocational education compete for the same jobs. This assumption
is in line with the fundamental question we address, that is, whether schooling programs
should become more vocational or more general; it is less adapted to the ISCED divide
between vocational and general education. For instance, the only way to become a nurse
is to follow a nurse training program. Second, we assume that people have more or less
the same education level. However, vocational programs tend to be shorter than general
programs. We nally neglect worker ex ante heterogeneity and resulting composition
e¤ects induced by self-selection in education type. More generally, the characteristics of
specialists coincide with the characteristics of generalists in our model.
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The calibration strategy is as described in Sub-section 2.4. In each country we nd
the value of parameter  of the matching technology and the value of market tightness 
that reproduce the specialist and generalist unemployment rates at observed proportion
of specialists x0. We then choose the productivity premium  and nd the job creation
cost c such that ^ (z0) = . We nally select the cost of acquiring specialized skills 
such that the (stable) equilibrium proportion of specialists is x = x0. Formally, we have
 = U

^ (z0) ; z0

: (38)
Once the parameter set is found for each country, we compute the e¢ cient allocation. We
nd the socially optimal proportion of specialists xs, the corresponding sectorial propor-
tion of specialists zs, and associated unemployment rates uss and u
s
g. We nally compute
the Pigouvian tax ts on vocational education that decentralizes the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation:
ts = U

^ (zs) ; zs

  : (39)
The productivity premium is a key variable because it governs the magnitude of the
positive externality associated with the proportion of specialists. In the absence of external
country-specic information available for all countries, we consider di¤erent values of the
productivity premium. We report the whole results for  = 0 that is, there are no wage
di¤erentials across education type and  = 20% that is, the wage premium accruing to
specialists is 20%. On top of that, we also report the value of the productivity premium
(if any) such that the actual allocation is e¢ cient.
4.1 Results for upper-secondary graduates
We consider the 18 countries featured by Table 1.
Table A1 in the Appendix gives the values of the calibrated parameters for the di¤erent
countries and for both values of . The mean job creation cost amounts to between 13.5%
( = 0) and 15.1% ( = 20%) of output per worker. The values are larger when the
productivity premium is 20% because equilibrium tightness must stay the same whereas
the workforce is more productive on average. The mean di¤erential schooling cost is -
0.5% when  = 0 and +8.7% when  = 20%. Here again, the di¤erential schooling cost
is larger when  = 20% because the equilibrium proportion of specialists must stay the
same, whereas specialists receive higher wages. The case  = 0 is quasi compatible with
a situation where the di¤erential schooling cost is zero, which explains our preference for
this parameterization.
Table 3 compares the actual allocation with the e¢ cient allocation when  = 0 and
when  = 20%. Self-selection is always ine¢ cient. The private di¤erential return to
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becoming a specialist is higher than the social return. Consequently, too many people
become specialists. The magnitude of ine¢ ciency decreases with . When  = 0, the e¢ -
cient proportion is, on average, 28 percentage points lower than the empirical proportion.
When  = 20%, the di¤erence falls to 18 percentage points.
[Insert Table 3]
Ine¢ ciency results in additional unemployment risk. The unemployment rate is almost
always larger in the decentralized economy than in the e¢ cient allocation. Designing a
good education policy, therefore, can lead to employment gains. Subsidizing general pro-
grams (or, alternatively, taxing vocational programs) can reduce the global unemployment
rate by 1.1 percentage points ( = 20%) to 1.8 percentage points ( = 0) on average.
The people who remain specialists would be the winners of such policies towards gen-
eral education. Table 3 displays small changes for the generalists, whereas the specialist
unemployment rate would be massively reduced. German specialists for instance would
see their unemployment rate fall from 8.5% to 3.55%. By contrast, the generalist unem-
ployment rate would not change.
The magnitude of ine¢ ciency can be measured by the Pigouvian tax on vocational
education. This tax varies between 0.5% and 5% of output per worker when  = 0. What
do these gures mean? In our static model output per worker represents output over
ones lifetime. Let us assume that people work 40 years and that they discount time at
5% yearly rate. The present value of the future ows of output at labor market entry is
roughly 20 times the yearly ow. The Pigouvian fee therefore amounts to between 0.1
year and one year of output. The individual wage is half total output. The tax amounts
to between 0.2 and two years of yearly earnings. This tax is paid over the number of years
spent in vocational education.
Table 3 also provides the threshold  such that the actual allocation is e¢ cient. The
threshold productivity di¤erential varies between 22.5% in the Netherlands and 140% in
Greece. It does not exist in four countries, which means that the proportion of specialists
is always too high in these countries.9 These values are not empirically credible because
they imply enormous wage di¤erentials across education type. They also imply very large
schooling cost di¤erentials (not reported here).
9Increasing the productivity premium expands the magnitude of the positive externality associated
with the proportion of specialists. However, it also reduces the chances of having an interior equilibrium
all individuals want to become specialists.
24
4.2 Results for tertiary graduates
We consider all available countries from the OECD dataset. The list of countries does
not coincide with the list in the case of upper-secondary graduates.
Table A2 in the Appendix gives the calibrated parameters for both values of . The
mean job creation cost varies between 9.7% and 10.5%. The mean schooling cost di¤er-
ential is roughly equal to zero when  = 0, whereas it is equal to 9.3% when  = 20%.
Table 4 compares the actual allocation with the e¢ cient one. Here again the actual
proportion of specialists is too large when  = 0. However, the di¤erence is less spectacular
than in the case of secondary graduates: the e¢ cient proportion is 19 points lower than the
actual proportion; the proportion of specialists is even too small in Switzerland. Reducing
the proportion of specialists to its e¢ cient level would decrease the unemployment rate by
half a point on average. The results are qualitatively similar when  = 20%; employment
gains are nonexistent.
Table 4 also provides the productivity premium implying that the actual allocation
is e¢ cient. The values are much lower than in the case of upper-secondary graduates.
However, the mean value across countries is still  = 50%. Taken together our results
suggest that the proportion of specialists is slightly too high at tertiary level.
[Insert Table 4]
5 Conclusion
There is a growing debate in education as to whether vocational education o¤ers better
labor market performances than general education. On the one hand, vocational education
is closer to employersneeds, and students who follow such programs are more employable
as a result. On the other hand, general education a¤ords adaptability skills and gives
access to more jobs. In this paper, we provide a matching model of the labor market.
The model features two sectors, endogenous job creation, and skill type heterogeneity.
Specialists are more productive but can only work in one sector. Generalists are less
productive but seek for jobs in both sectors. To account for the fact that employers prefer
specialists to generalists in each sector, we consider a particular matching technology. The
matching function displays asymmetric cross-type congestion externalities. Specialists
create congestion for all and generalists do not a¤ect the odds of employment for the
specialists. In other words, generalists can participate in several job queues at a time, but
stay behind in each queue; specialists are given a unique chance, but are put rst in the
queue.
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Self-selection in education type vehicles three main externalities. First, the proportion
of specialists boosts job creation in each sector: specialists are more productive and
so rent-sharing allows employers to obtain more prots with them. Second, generalists
improve the e¢ ciency of the matching technology: a specialist can be seen as an input of
the matching technology in a single sector, whereas a generalist is an input in both sectors.
Third, generalists may receive several job o¤ers at a time. This possibility exacerbates
rms coordination problems and reduces the ratio of vacancies to job seekers in each
sector. Such externalities may lead to multiple equilibria and imply that subsidizing a
particular program can improve welfare.
We calibrate the model on OECD data at country level. The focus is on upper-
secondary graduates. We match the actual proportion of specialists and unemployment
rates by education type and then compare the actual allocation with the e¢ cient one.
Our calibrations show that too many people have become specialists in OECD countries.
Unemployment risk could be reduced by about 1.5 point if the proportion of specialists
were set at an e¢ cient level. We also focus on tertiary educated and reach similar qual-
itative results: there are too many specialists on average. However, the magnitude of
ine¢ ciency is much lower than in the case of upper-secondary graduates: employment
gains are negligible and the proportion of specialists proves to be too small in a minority
of countries.
The present paper can be extended in several directions. By design a static model
does not a¤ord an insight as to the impact of education type on job loss probability.
Specialists should be less exposed to the risk of dismissal in regular times; generalists
should be more able to cope with technological change. The model, similarly, does not
say anything about job-to-job transitions. Moreover the productivity premium beneting
specialists is exogenous. It may depend on experience and tenure. It may even reverse if
generalists accumulate human capital faster than specialists. Finally, our model abstracts
from worker ex ante heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity may lead to rich composition
e¤ects in education groups. It may also involve the use of micro data.
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Fig.1 : Beveridge curve and the specialist proportion. 
The Figure depicts the two effects of an increase in the specialist proportion. The Beveridge 
curve moves rightward and tightness moves upward in each sector. 
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Fig.2a: U
nem
ploym
ent rates as a function of the specialist 
proportion; rho = 0 
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Fig.2b: Specialist unem
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ent rates as a function of the specialist 
proportion and productivity differential 
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Fig.2c: G
eneralist unem
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ent rate as a function of the specialist 
proportion and productivity differential 
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Fig.2d: O
verall unem
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ent rate as a function of the specialist 
proportion and productivity differential 
 
 
lambdabar cbar dchibar cbar dchibar
Australia 1.024 0.147 0.014 0.155 0.110
Austria 5.049 0.179 ‐0.001 0.210 0.096
Belgium 0.482 0.051 ‐0.014 0.054 0.077
Czech Republic 0.852 0.119 ‐0.013 0.132 0.079
Denmark 4.644 0.200 0.007 0.233 0.102
France 1.734 0.207 0.002 0.238 0.093
Germany 1.019 0.091 ‐0.027 0.108 0.065
Greece 0.412 0.102 ‐0.001 0.106 0.084
Hungary 0.787 0.091 ‐0.014 0.100 0.078
Ireland 1.503 0.131 0.003 0.143 0.100
Italy 0.651 0.138 0.011 0.145 0.102
Luxembourg 2.313 0.138 ‐0.001 0.156 0.097
Netherlands 2.289 0.162 0.005 0.181 0.103
New Zealand 1.741 0.162 ‐0.005 0.186 0.090
Poland 0.503 0.124 ‐0.021 0.137 0.060
Slovak Republic 0.424 0.099 ‐0.029 0.109 0.050
Switzerland 15.350 0.167 0.004 0.196 0.102
Turkey 0.636 0.125 ‐0.002 0.134 0.087
Mean 2.301 0.135 ‐0.005 0.151 0.087
In each country, the parameters λ, c, and Δχ are computed so as to match equilibrium 
unemployment rates by education type and specialist proportion with their empirical 
counterparts. The row "Mean" gives the average value for each variable.
Table A1: Calibrated parameters as a function of ρ, case of upper‐secondary graduates
rho = 0 rho = 20%
lim
it
x0
us0
ug0
u0
xeff
useff
ugeff
ueff
xeff
useff
ugeff
ueff
rho
A
ustralia
0.270
0.039
0.067
0.059
0.086
0.012
0.065
0.061
0.210
0.031
0.068
0.060
0.35
A
ustria
0.880
0.033
0.032
0.033
0.637
0.011
0.032
0.019
0.742
0.020
0.035
0.024
0.725
Belgium
0.250
0.089
0.061
0.068
0.020
0.026
0.057
0.056
0.072
0.050
0.060
0.059
1.4
Czech Republic
0.560
0.090
0.065
0.079
0.178
0.034
0.060
0.055
0.298
0.055
0.066
0.063
1.85
D
enm
ark
0.830
0.041
0.054
0.043
0.574
0.013
0.053
0.030
0.680
0.024
0.058
0.035
0.87
France
0.750
0.087
0.091
0.088
0.374
0.029
0.084
0.063
0.496
0.049
0.095
0.072
.
G
erm
any
0.940
0.085
0.031
0.082
0.403
0.035
0.028
0.031
0.524
0.050
0.032
0.041
.
G
reece
0.210
0.152
0.150
0.150
0.010
0.043
0.140
0.139
0.049
0.084
0.146
0.143
1.7
H
ungary
0.510
0.076
0.048
0.062
0.152
0.029
0.044
0.042
0.265
0.047
0.049
0.048
1.4
Ireland
0.450
0.025
0.030
0.028
0.272
0.012
0.030
0.025
0.416
0.023
0.030
0.027
0.27
Italy
0.250
0.090
0.112
0.107
0.030
0.023
0.105
0.103
0.109
0.054
0.112
0.105
0.87
Luxem
bourg
0.650
0.020
0.018
0.019
0.482
0.011
0.018
0.015
0.621
0.018
0.018
0.018
0.26
N
etherlands
0.570
0.022
0.032
0.026
0.422
0.012
0.033
0.024
0.559
0.021
0.032
0.026
0.225
N
ew
 Zealand
0.730
0.055
0.045
0.052
0.397
0.021
0.043
0.034
0.527
0.035
0.048
0.041
1.05
Poland
0.510
0.192
0.151
0.172
0.091
0.079
0.134
0.129
0.186
0.118
0.146
0.141
.
Slovak Republic
0.500
0.210
0.152
0.181
0.077
0.093
0.135
0.132
0.165
0.133
0.146
0.144
.
Sw
itzerland
0.870
0.023
0.033
0.024
0.656
0.006
0.032
0.015
0.756
0.014
0.035
0.019
0.585
Turkey
0.350
0.109
0.105
0.106
0.058
0.035
0.097
0.093
0.152
0.066
0.104
0.098
1.4
M
ean
0.560
0.080
0.071
0.077
0.273
0.029
0.066
0.059
0.379
0.049
0.071
0.065
.
The calibrated param
eters are given by Tables 2 and A
1. The efficient allocation m
axim
izes the social criterion given in Sub‐section 3.3. W
e distinguish tw
o configurations, 
w
hether rho = 0 or rho = 20%
. The row
 "M
ean" gives the average value for each variable. The colum
n "lim
it rho" provides the value of rho (if any) such that the actual allocation 
is efficient.
Table 3: Efficient allocation vs observed allocation, case of upper‐secondary graduates
efficient allocation w
hen rho = 20%
efficient allocation w
hen rho = 0
observed allocation
lambdabar cbar dchibar cbar dchibar
Australia 0.689 0.055 ‐0.010 0.059 0.085
Austria 2.423 0.145 0.004 0.160 0.103
Belgium 1.585 0.140 0.000 0.156 0.097
Canada 1.167 0.122 ‐0.004 0.134 0.091
Denmark 4.124 0.190 0.008 0.218 0.105
Finland 0.920 0.094 ‐0.011 0.104 0.083
France 1.276 0.154 0.003 0.169 0.098
Germany 0.994 0.103 ‐0.004 0.111 0.091
Greece 0.637 0.104 ‐0.003 0.110 0.089
Ireland 1.135 0.081 ‐0.003 0.087 0.095
Korea 0.550 0.038 ‐0.015 0.040 0.078
Luxembourg 1.194 0.068 ‐0.002 0.073 0.096
Netherlands 0.677 0.042 0.000 0.043 0.098
New Zealand 1.356 0.137 0.003 0.149 0.100
Portugal 0.972 0.095 0.001 0.101 0.098
Slovak Republic 0.272 0.008 ‐0.017 0.008 0.074
Switzerland 2.316 0.137 0.006 0.149 0.105
United States 0.592 0.028 ‐0.004 0.028 0.094
Mean 1.271 0.097 ‐0.003 0.105 0.093
Table A2: Calibrated parameters as a function of ρ, case of tertiary graduates
In each country, the parameters λ, c, and Δχ are computed so as to match equilibrium 
unemployment rates by education type and specialist proportion with their empirical 
counterparts. The row "Mean" gives the average value for each variable.
rho = 0 rho = 20%
lim
it
x0
us0
ug0
u0
xeff
useff
ugeff
ueff
xeff
useff
ugeff
ueff
rho
A
ustralia
0.328
0.050
0.030
0.036
0.063
0.016
0.028
0.028
0.174
0.033
0.030
0.031
0.82
A
ustria
0.520
0.013
0.021
0.016
0.453
0.009
0.021
0.016
0.592
0.016
0.019
0.018
0.08
Belgium
0.551
0.033
0.033
0.033
0.323
0.015
0.033
0.027
0.462
0.026
0.034
0.031
0.42
Canada
0.516
0.047
0.039
0.043
0.230
0.019
0.038
0.033
0.364
0.033
0.040
0.037
0.67
D
enm
ark
0.736
0.027
0.042
0.031
0.556
0.012
0.043
0.025
0.671
0.021
0.044
0.029
0.38
Finland
0.535
0.060
0.037
0.049
0.190
0.023
0.035
0.033
0.316
0.038
0.038
0.038
1.06
France
0.498
0.051
0.056
0.053
0.230
0.020
0.055
0.047
0.364
0.036
0.058
0.050
0.62
G
erm
any
0.427
0.045
0.037
0.040
0.157
0.017
0.035
0.032
0.287
0.031
0.038
0.036
0.6
G
reece
0.299
0.086
0.081
0.082
0.044
0.025
0.076
0.073
0.127
0.051
0.081
0.077
1.05
Ireland
0.389
0.023
0.017
0.019
0.186
0.010
0.017
0.016
0.330
0.019
0.017
0.018
0.32
Korea
0.312
0.064
0.033
0.043
0.044
0.022
0.031
0.030
0.118
0.038
0.033
0.033
1.2
Luxem
bourg
0.366
0.015
0.010
0.012
0.198
0.007
0.010
0.010
0.351
0.014
0.011
0.012
0.23
N
etherlands
0.106
0.020
0.021
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.020
0.020
0.044
0.011
0.021
0.020
0.38
N
ew
 Zealand
0.438
0.033
0.039
0.036
0.234
0.014
0.039
0.033
0.371
0.027
0.040
0.035
0.36
Portugal
0.287
0.030
0.033
0.032
0.091
0.010
0.032
0.030
0.218
0.023
0.033
0.031
0.336
Slovak Republic
0.061
0.090
0.055
0.057
0.000
0.000
0.056
0.056
0.000
0.000
0.056
0.056
0.24
Sw
itzerland
0.401
0.007
0.019
0.014
0.416
0.008
0.019
0.014
0.564
0.014
0.016
0.015
0
U
nited States
0.124
0.026
0.018
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.017
0.017
0.063
0.017
0.018
0.018
0.57
M
ean
0.383
0.040
0.034
0.035
0.190
0.013
0.033
0.030
0.301
0.025
0.035
0.032
0.519
Table 4: Efficient allocation vs observed allocation, case of tertiary graduates
The calibrated param
eters are given by Tables 2 and A
2. The efficient allocation m
axim
izes the social criterion given in Sub‐section 3.3. W
e distinguish tw
o configurations, w
hether 
rho = 0 or rho = 20%
. The row
 "M
ean" gives the average value for each variable. The colum
n "lim
it rho" provides the value of rho (if any) such that the actual allocation is efficient.
observed allocation
efficient allocation w
hen rho = 0
efficient allocation w
hen rho = 20%
